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 Aﬀ ordable Housing in Iowa: 
Meeting New Challenges
Executive Summary
 Iowa faces a signifi cant challenge over the next decade. In the words of a recent report, “The 
state faces the danger of worker and skill gaps that could undermine its businesses, erode the 
earning power of its workers, and slow its economic growth.” (Iowa Works Campaign, 2006)
Iowa’s economic and demographic stability depends on attracting new immigrants and slowing 
the departure of residents. Eroding housing affordability and quality will make this more 
diffi cult. Housing alone cannot solve the problem, but it must be part of the solution. 
This study examines trends in the state’s major housing markets, analyzes the achievements 
of housing programs in the recent past, and incorporates input from more than 80 housing 
experts across the state. The second part of this study (included on the attached CD) analyzes 
housing’s impact on the economy. We developed three major policy recommendations.
 Recommendation I: 
Iowa needs a statewide housing policy. Without agreement on a proactive strategy, a valuable 
asset—not just many local housing markets throughout the state, but more important, the 
families they house—will continue to trickle through our fi ngers. Our current approach—to 
do our best to spend shrinking federal resources responsibly—does not focus on the major 
challenges we will face by 2017. If we do not decide where to go, we cannot begin to talk 
about how to get there.
Recommendation II:
Stable, predictable funding and effi cient use of resources are both essential for an effective 
housing policy. Investing in housing is a long-term strategy, and short-term fl uctuations in 
funding undermine our progress. Iowa’s developers, mortgage lenders, local governments, 
nonprofi t agencies and families need a reliable commitment and a stable partnership to back 
their real estate investments. We also need to evaluate whether existing resources could be 
used more effectively. 
Recommendation III:
Build developer capacity and streamline the development environment. Better local capacity 
will expand the reach of programs and ensure that resources are used more effectively. In 
too many communities, small-scale demand makes it uneconomical for the private for-profi t 
and nonprofi t sectors to use existing programs. In some communities, local regulatory and 
political barriers increase the costs of development or rehabilitation, reducing fi nancial 
feasibility and requiring more subsidies. When only a few developers compete for specialized 
programs, some types of worthwhile projects may be neglected. 
This Report’s Speciﬁ c Findings Focused on Two Main Questions: 
• How have Iowa’s housing markets changed between 2000 and 2005? 
• How effectively have state and federal programs responded to these changing needs? 
Participants in a series of housing forums in early 2007 identifi ed the major gaps in current 
programs, the major challenges Iowa will face in the next decade, and discussed ways we 
could meet those challenges.
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Iowa’s Housing Markets
• Most housing markets slackened as housing growth outstripped population growth.
• A few metropolitan areas saw robust growth, but much of this growth occurred in fringe   
 rather than central counties. 
• Iowa’s population became more diverse, and future homeownership demand will likely   
 grow fastest among racial and ethnic minorities. 
• Housing prices grew much faster than family incomes, suggesting that the affordability 
 gap will be a continuing concern, especially if the state is to continue to attract
 new immigrants.
• Affordability problems did not worsen signifi cantly, but this may refl ect widening income  
 disparities rather than increasing affordability.
• There were encouraging signs that efforts to eliminate lead hazards may be paying off in  
 the decline in the percent of children testing positive for lead poisoning.
 Current Housing Policy 
• Current levels of subsidy, especially for renter households, are inadequate to the volume of  
 need. At our current pace, it would take 20 years to address homeowners’ housing needs,  
 and 64 years to address renters’ housing needs. 
• Renters need housing assistance most in the rapidly growing metropolitan and fringe
 communities they work in, but much of our subsidized housing stock is elsewhere.
• Preserving the existing subsidized rental stock will require careful choices about where   
 we should focus our efforts. 
• Home buyer assistance is targeted to households not communities, but fi rst-time buyers   
 may not be able to use assistance as easily in a few high-cost markets. 
• Home rehabilitation assistance is well-targeted to older communities, but future assistance  
 may need to consider the concentration of sub-prime home improvement loans  in 
 some places.
Housing Forum Findings
• Funding levels are shrinking, further reducing our ability to meet needs.
• Unstable and unpredictable funding makes it diffi cult to develop and sustain our capacity  
 to address housing needs. 
• Without clearly articulated and/or agreed-upon housing goals, we cannot expect to   
 distribute resources effectively.
• Complex and uncoordinated programs that few understand do not use resources effectively. 
• We need to develop stronger partnerships with employers, local governments, and related  
 interests such as transportation, environmental preservation, health, education and   
 economic development.  
• Stabilizing homeownership, especially among newer owners, is essential to avert projected  
 increases in mortgage foreclosures, especially among sub-prime borrowers. If foreclosures  
 are concentrated in the same communities sub-prime loans are concentrated in, there   
 could be damaging longer-term effects. 
• Housing the working poor, people with disabilities and those facing homelessness will   
 require much deeper subsidies than are available now. 
• Developing more sustainable homes may avert future preservation crises. Energy-effi cient  
 construction has higher capital costs but lower life-cycle costs; universal design can avoid  
 costly future retrofi tting. 
• Countering the negative image of affordable housing in some communities will be essential  
 to streamline the development process, avoid unnecessary urban sprawl and ensure the   
 labor force has homes available in the communities in which they work.

Iowa’s Changing Population, Economy and Housing Stock
Section One:
Section One 
 As people age, migrate and form new kinds of households, their housing needs change. 
Their ability to pay for the housing they need also changes, as their incomes and 
housing costs ﬂ uctuate. Housing costs change depending not only on effective demand, 
but also on the pace of construction or conversion, and on the price of components 
such as ﬁ nancing and energy. Because housing is such an important driver of local 
economies, and is such an important basic need, governments intervene in several 
ways to ensure that markets work as efﬁ ciently and equitably as possible. But for 
intervention to be effective, we need to understand current trends and evaluate 
regularly how well our strategies are working.
 This study aims to inform these tasks. The study has two parts: The fi rst focuses on housing needs 
and housing policy, while the second part investigates the economic and social impacts of housing 
subsidies. We address two broad questions in this report:
• How have Iowa’s housing markets changed between 2000 and 2005? 
• How effectively have state and federal programs responded to these changing needs? 
In the conclusion, we present a series of recommendations for strengthening housing development 
policy in Iowa. These conclusions are based on a series of discussion forums attended by housing 
experts from around Iowa, as well as on the study fi ndings. 
The second volume of this study assesses the economic and social impacts of housing programs. 
Data Sources
Our conclusions are based on a wide range of data, but our primary data source, the 2005 
American Community Survey (ACS), is available only for counties (and places) with 65,000 
people or more. When available, we also use data from County Assessors’ offi ces and the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act, which cover at least some trends in smaller counties. Thus, although we 
are able to draw some conclusions about housing conditions in all of Iowa’s 99 counties, there are 
some questions we can only answer for the nine major metropolitan counties covered by the 2005 
ACS data. We also cannot provide the same level of spatial detail that was possible in previous 
assessments that used decennial census data. ACS data is not yet reported for census tracts; it 
is drawn from a much smaller sample than decennial data, so even the data we have available 
for counties and the state as a whole is less precise than census data. Consequently, we report 
the margin of error around all ACS estimates, and we discuss which differences are statistically 
signifi cant and which may be only random. Data sources and their limitations are discussed 
in more detail in Appendix A. Another important source of data was the forums we held with 
participants from around the state.
 
Chart 1.1: Population change, 2000-2005
0.00% 0.50% 1.00% 1.50% 2.00% 2.50% 3.00% 3.50% 4.00% 4.50% 5.00%
Illinois
Iowa
Kansas
Minnesota
Missouri
Nebraska
South Dakota
Wisconsin
CHART 1.1:
Population Change, 2000–2005
By State
5
 -1.2%
 -1.0%
 -0.8%
 -0.6%
 -0.4%
 -0.2%
0.0%
  0.2%
  0.4%
  0.6%
  0.8%
 1.0%
Ill
in
oi
s
Io
w
a
Ka
ns
as
M
in
ne
so
ta
M
is
so
ur
i
N
eb
ra
sk
a
So
ut
h 
D
ak
ot
a
W
is
co
ns
in
Net international migration as %
natural increase
Net internal migration as % natural
increase
CHART 1.2:
Source of Population Change, 2000–2005
By State
 Demographic, Economic and Housing Market Trends are Linked. 
This Section Investigates the Following Questions: 
• How has Iowa’s population and economic prosperity changed between 2000 and 2005? 
• Where has Iowa’s housing stock grown? 
• What’s happened to homeownership, housing values and rents?      
• What’s happened to housing affordability and quality? 
 Iowa’s Changing Population
Iowa grew more slowly than the nation and than its neighbors; from 2000–2005, Census estimates 
place it as the eighth-slowest-growing state, at 1.36% (compared to 5.3% for the nation as a 
whole). If this rate of growth continues for the remainder of the decade, it will mark a slowdown 
from the 1990s. 
Without a net gain of nearly 30,000 international immigrants, Iowa’s population may not have 
grown at all. While international immigrants did not offset the net loss of more than 41,000 people 
who moved out of Iowa to elsewhere in the United States, they did help to slow the decline. Chart 
1.2 shows that net international migration was more than half that of the natural increase (births 
minus deaths) in the state, higher than all neighboring states except Illinois.
6
7 These gains were not distributed evenly, as Map 1.1 shows. Fifty-two counties lost more than 1% of 
their population between 2000 and 2005; only fi ve grew by 5% or more. Growth in Dallas County 
(estimated at 27% of the 2000 population) far outstripped that in the rest of the state. Iowa’s 
population continues to move to metropolitan areas, especially around two main nodes—the 
Des Moines metro area and east-central Iowa.
Iowa’s population became more ethnically diverse. The percent of non-Hispanic African-
Americans increased slightly from 2.1% to 2.23%, although this population remained 
concentrated in a few metropolitan areas (Waterloo-Cedar Falls and the Quad Cities). The 
percent of Hispanics (of any race) increased faster, from 2.8% to 3.67%. Map 1.2 shows that six 
nonmetropolitan counties and one metropolitan county (Woodbury) had more than 10%
Hispanic residents. 
Iowa has proportionately fewer children than it did in 2000, and slightly more working-age adults. 
The estimated proportion of elderly residents (65 and older) has remained very similar to 2000. 
Map 1.3 shows the estimated distribution of the elderly population in 2005.
Section One
MAP 1.1:
Estimated Population Change, 2000–2005
MAP 1.2:
Estimated Percent Hispanic Residents, 2000–2005
8 Economic Prosperity
 Real incomes in Iowa may have declined since 2000, as they did throughout the Midwest. The 
evidence for the trends discussed below is suggestive rather than conclusive, because the data 
are drawn from two different surveys that include slightly different populations (as Appendix A 
explains). Chart 1.3 on page 9 shows region-wide changes in family median incomes between 
1999 (the data collected in the 2000 Census of Population and Housing) and 2005 (based on 
data collected in the American Community Survey, or ACS). If we convert 1999 median income 
estimates to 2005 dollars (using the Consumer Price Index to account for infl ation), it appears 
that real median incomes (expressed in 2005 dollars) declined during the fi rst half of this decade. 
However, Iowa’s decline is proportionately smaller, at 2.3%, than declines in neighboring states.
 Incomes have not declined at the same rate in all of Iowa’s large counties. Incomes may have grown 
or remained stable in Dubuque, Pottawattamie, Scott, Story and Woodbury counties. But declines 
in Black Hawk, Johnson, Linn and Polk counties are likely real rather than the result of a smaller 
sample; even the “high” estimates for 2005 are lower than real 1999 median incomes. 
But not all households are worse off. A signifi cantly higher proportion of families reported incomes 
of more than $75,000 in 2005 (33.7%), compared to 1999 (26.3%). However, the proportion of 
households with incomes of less than $20,000 also increased slightly, from 11.1% to 11.9%. On 
average, new migrants were poorer than people who had lived in the same place for at least a year. 
Because younger households and renters are more likely to move, we would expect this. Attracting 
new migrants may be essential for Iowa’s future growth, but those migrants are likely to have lower 
incomes than established residents, at least initially.
Poverty rates mirrored declining incomes, increasing throughout the region. Iowa’s increase in 
individual poverty, from 8.82% in 1999 to 10.84% in 2005, was the second largest rise in the 
region, although most of Iowa’s neighbors have higher actual poverty rates.  
Trends in poverty were less clear at the county level. Chart 1.6 on page 10 shows changes in child 
poverty rates. Smaller sample sizes mean that we can only be confi dent that child poverty rates 
increased in two counties—Linn and Woodbury—where even the low estimates for 2005 are 
higher than the 1999 rates. Child poverty rates appear to have declined rather than increased 
in Polk County. Trends in the remaining larger counties are inconclusive; although the mid-
range rates estimated by the ACS are higher than the rates estimated in the 2000 Census, these 
differences may be the result of the smaller sample size in 2005 rather than real trends. However, 
statewide increases in poverty suggest that ACS mid-range estimates may be a reasonable guide. 
The 2005 estimate of Iowa’s homeless population supports these results; the study found that the 
homeless population has likely grown by at least 14% since 1999, and that families with children 
now make up a majority (61%) of homeless households (Iowa Policy Project, 2006).
MAP 1.3:
Estimated Distribution of the Elderly Population, 2000–2005
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 Iowa’s Changing Housing Stock
Iowa’s population grew by only 1.3% during the fi rst half of this decade, but the Census Bureau 
estimates that the supply of housing grew by 6% over the same period. Estimated housing 
growth in Iowa far outstripped estimated population growth, and the margin was wider than in 
neighboring states, as Chart 1.7 shows.
Growth was concentrated in a few metropolitan counties. The Des Moines, Ames, Cedar Rapids 
and Iowa City metropolitan areas dominated growth over this period. Fringe suburban counties 
grew as fast or faster than some metropolitan counties. 
Growth appears to have resulted in softer housing markets throughout the region, with 2005 
vacancy rates higher than 2000 rates. Vacant units are identifi ed in a different way in 2005 
compared to 2000, so we may be seeing the results of methodological changes rather than a real 
shift, as Appendix A explains. Regionally, Iowa compares well with its neighbors, with the lowest 
vacancy rates and one of the lowest rates of increase in vacancies. Nevertheless, a statewide 
vacancy rate of more than 8% suggests housing growth may be too rapid to be sustained.  
Johnson, Linn, Polk, Scott and Story counties appear to have signifi cantly softer housing markets 
in 2005 compared to 2000. However, some of this may be a result of more seasonally vacant 
units. The fi nal column for each county in Chart 1.8 adjusts for this, showing 2005 vacancy rates 
without including units that are vacant because of the way “residence” has been redefi ned. In 
Black Hawk, Linn and Woodbury counties, this adjustment alters estimated vacancy rates only 
marginally, but it has a greater effect in Dubuque, Scott and Story counties.
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CHART 1.7:
Comparing Housing and Population Growth
in the Region, 2000–2005, By State
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CHART 1.8:
Change in Vacancy Rates, 2000–2005
By County
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 Changes in Homeownership
Nationally, homeownership continued to increase, in part because of continued low loan interest 
rates. Homeownership rates increased slightly in Iowa, but not as fast as in neighboring states with 
larger metropolitan areas. Homeownership rates increased in Dubuque, Johnson, Polk and Scott 
counties over this period, but they may have declined in Woodbury County since 2000. Declines 
(which were concentrated among middle-aged households) were likely due to a combination of the 
movement of a substantial number of managerial jobs out of Sioux City, and the effects of different 
tax regimes in the Iowa portions of the metropolitan area compared to the South Dakota portion. 
Homeownership rates vary widely among racial and ethnic minorities in different metropolitan 
areas. In Black Hawk, Polk and Scott counties, homeownership rates for African-Americans are 
close to or higher than rates for the nation as a whole. But ownership rates for African-Americans 
are much lower than the average for the nation in the remaining metropolitan areas. Asian 
households have ownership rates close to or above the national average in Linn, Polk, Scott and 
Woodbury counties. 
Ownership rates among Asians are likely low in Johnson and Story counties because of the high 
proportion of students among that population. For Hispanic households, ownership rates are higher 
than the national average in all except Black Hawk and Johnson counties.  
Mortgage lending patterns offer another picture of homeownership trends. Map 1.5 on page 13 
shows the average incomes of households who purchased homes in 2005. Home buyers were 
wealthier on average in two high-cost housing markets (Johnson and Dallas counties), and in 
Jefferson County, which has a major educational institution that creates a unique housing market. 
In the majority of counties, buyers had average incomes close to the median for the state ($45,000 
to $60,000). 
Minority borrowers (those of any ethnicity who reported their primary race as something other than 
white) represented a very small proportion of all buyers in most counties. Hispanic home buyers 
made up a larger share of the market, and accounted for a substantial share of borrowers in 
some counties. 
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CHART 1.9:
Change in Homeownership Rate, 2000–2005
By County
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CHART 1.10:
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MAP 1.4:
Estimated Housing Growth, 2000–2005
MAP 1.5:
Average Income of Home Buyers, 2005
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MAP 1.6:
Percent Hispanic Home Buyers, 2005
MAP 1.7:
Average Residential Sales Prices, 2005
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 Trends in Home Prices
Map 1.7 on page 14 shows average sales prices based on verifi ed sales reported by County 
Assessors. Several counties in the west and south of the state report average sales prices of 
less than $60,000, well below replacement value. Even counties with sales in the $60,000 to 
$80,000 range may have diffi culty attracting new construction because new homes are less likely 
to be appraised for what they cost to build. The problem in low-priced counties may be declining 
housing quality because of a “value gap,” in contrast to counties with average sales prices above 
$120,000, which may face deteriorating ownership affordability because of an “affordability gap.”
Price increases have been quite rapid (more than 25%) in some counties, mostly among those 
on the suburban fringe of metropolitan areas. The central metropolitan counties report sales 
price increases in the 10% to 25% range. A cluster of counties in the north-central and extreme 
southwest portions of the state have also seen substantial price rises since 2000 although, with 
the exception of Mills and Cerro Gordo counties, average prices in these areas remain modest 
compared to the rest of the state. 
Data on home values from the American Community Survey is not directly comparable to sales 
prices because it is based on owners’ assessments of what their home is worth, rather than a record 
of an actual market transaction. Nevertheless, median home values can be a rough indicator of the 
health of housing markets. Unlike median family incomes, median home values have appreciated 
substantially in real terms, although Iowa’s increase of just less than 14% is moderate compared to 
increases of 20% to more than 40% in neighboring states with large metropolitan areas. 
Section One
MAP 1.8:
Home Price Increases, 2000–2005
MAP 1.9:
Average Loan Size by County, 2005
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Black Hawk, Polk, Pottawattamie and Scott counties all saw real increases in median reported 
home values of more than 15% from 2000 to 2005. Woodbury County saw very little appreciation 
(refl ecting its falling homeownership rate), and appreciation in reported values in Johnson County 
was lackluster at just over 5%. Appendix B provides updated estimates of the distribution of home 
values for all counties in the state. 
Map 1.9 shows the average size of loans originated for single-family home purchases in Iowa in 
2005 (from Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data). These average loan sizes are mostly consistent 
with the information from County Assessors’ offi ces. Appendix B shows the distribution of loans by 
quartile for each county in the state. 
Overall, home prices appear to have appreciated steadily while incomes have declined. But these 
trends have been less acute in Iowa than in some neighboring states. 
A fi nal issue that may affect the stability of homeownership is the incidence of sub-prime lending. 
Much of the expansion in homeownership to lower-income home buyers over the past several 
years has been enabled by new types of loans that accept greater levels of risk in return for higher 
interest rates. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but recent trends show a rising incidence 
of foreclosures for owners with sub-prime loans. The proportion of sub-prime, fi rst-lien loans 
originated in Iowa in 2005 (17.6%) is lower than the proportion of sub-prime loans in the nation as 
a whole (23.6%). However, sub-prime loans (in the case of fi rst-lien loans, those with an interest 
rate of more than 3% above prime rates) are concentrated in some counties, as Map 1.10 shows.  
Rapidly growing counties are less likely to have high proportions of sub-prime loans, but they make 
up a substantial share of loans in less rapidly growing rural counties.
Trends in Rents
Rents grew at just less than the average for neighboring states (at 4.9% compared to 5.3% for 
the region). Real increases in Iowa were outstripped by more rapid growth (above 7%) in Illinois, 
Minnesota and Missouri. Although median rents grew faster than median family incomes in Iowa, 
as with home prices, the effect was moderate in comparison to some neighboring states.  
Overall, gross rents (including utilities) increased less rapidly than reported home values or mean 
sales prices in most major metropolitan counties, as Chart 1.11 on page 17 shows. Once we adjust 
2000 median gross rents for infl ation, it appears that some counties (Dubuque, Linn, Story and 
Woodbury) have seen negligible increases or slight declines. Others (Black Hawk, Johnson and 
Scott) have seen increases above 5%. Johnson County is the only metropolitan area where rents 
have infl ated faster than housing values, and estimated gross rents in the county are now the 
highest among central metropolitan counties.    
MAP 1.10:
Proportion of Sub-Prime First Mortgage Loans, 2005
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Section One
 Trends in Aﬀ ordability
Have upward trends in prices and rents resulted in worsening affordability compared to 2000? 
We use a standard defi nition of affordability: that households paying more than 30% of their 
income for housing costs are cost-burdened, and may have an affordability problem. Although 
home prices have risen faster than incomes, the ACS estimates provide little clear support for the 
argument that affordability has worsened for owner households. Chart 1.12 shows that although the 
proportion of cost-burdened owner households may have risen in Black Hawk, Dubuque, Linn and 
Pottawattamie counties, these increases are not statistically signifi cant. In the remaining major 
metropolitan counties, the 2005 ACS estimates that proportionately fewer households are paying 
more than 30% of their income for housing in 2005 compared to 2000. 
What could explain this? Mortgage interest rates1 have decreased steadily since 2000, and this 
may explain part of the apparent improvement in affordability despite the widening gap between 
incomes and housing prices. Targeted efforts to increase homeownership may be having positive 
effects. However, a more important explanation may be the changes in the underlying income 
distribution of homeowners between 2000 and 2005. In all except Johnson County, wealthier 
households (earning $75,000 or more) made up a larger share of homeowners in 2005 compared 
to 2000. 
In fact, the proportion of cost-burdened households rose within each income category, while 
affordability did not worsen overall because wealthier households are less likely to be cost-
burdened. For instance, for households earning incomes between $35,000 and $49,999 in 2005, 
an average of 23.1% were cost-burdened, up from an average of 15.2% in 2000. In contrast, for 
households earning $75,000 or more in 2005, an average of 3.2% were cost-burdened, up from 
1.7% in 2000. In 2005, because owners with incomes above $75,000 accounted for a higher 
proportion of owner-occupied households (32.9% vs. 27.9% in 2000), compared to the proportion 
accounted for by households earning between $35,000 and $49,999 (16.8% vs. 18.3% in 2000), 
the overall percentage of households who were cost-burdened declined. However, the proportion 
of cost-burdened households within each income category increased over the period. What we see 
in Chart 1.12 then may be the effect of increasing income inequality (or a growing affl uent class) 
rather than a decreasing gap between housing prices and incomes. Homeowner households with 
modest incomes paid proportionately more of those incomes for housing in 2005.  
Only in Black Hawk County was a statistically higher proportion of renters cost-burdened (paying 
more than 30% of their income for rent) in 2005 compared to 2000. In the remaining metropolitan 
counties, increases in cost-burdened renters were not statistically signifi cant. 
There may be similar income distribution effects with renters as with homeowners. In all except 
Story and Woodbury counties, higher income households (with incomes of $50,000 or more) made 
up a larger share of all renter households in 2005 compared to 2000. But only a tiny proportion of 
renter households earning $50,000 or more pay more than 30% of their income in rent. 
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CHART 1.11: 
Change in Median Gross Rent, 2000–2005
By County
1 Rates for 30-year, ﬁ xed-rate mortgages declined from 8.05% in 2000 to 5.83% in 2003, 
and were close to that low (at 5.87%) in 2005. Annual averages of 30-year ﬁ xed mortgage 
rates were obtained from http//www.freddiemac.com/pmms/docs/30yr_pmmsmnth.xls
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Within each income category, affordability worsened signifi cantly from 2000 to 2005. On average, 
among households earning between $20,000 and $34,999, 24.3% were cost-burdened in 2000, 
but 45.6% were cost-burdened in 2005. The situation was far worse for households earning 
$20,000 or less; on average, about 70% of households in this income category were cost-burdened 
in 2000, but nearly 85% were burdened in 2005.  
Affordability varies by age as well as income. Younger households, who are more likely to be 
fi rst-time buyers, may face greater burdens than older owners, because they are more likely to 
have purchased a home recently, and are not yet in their peak earning years. We would expect 
that as households age, they may be more likely to pay off their mortgages, and their incomes 
would increase while their expenses decreased. For elderly owners, however, fi xed incomes may 
mean they face rising cost burdens. Chart 1.14 on page 19 shows that in 2005, this pattern varied 
substantially between metro areas, even if we exclude the highly volatile estimates for owners 
younger than 25. The classic u-shaped curve held in Black Hawk, Linn and Polk counties, but not 
in Iowa’s other metropolitan areas. In some places, households with residents aged 35 to 64 years 
assumed higher cost burdens than others (perhaps voluntarily), and elderly households were not 
necessarily more likely to be cost-burdened. 
Among renter households, trends are a little more consistent across metro areas. Overall, younger 
and older households were more likely to be cost-burdened than households headed by someone 
between 25 and 64. Elderly renter households face unusual rent burdens in Black Hawk and 
Johnson counties. Young renters (a high proportion of whom are likely students) were more likely to 
have high cost burdens in Story and Johnson counties.  
In the majority of metropolitan counties (Black Hawk, Johnson, Linn, Polk, Story and Woodbury), a 
higher proportion of households younger than 25 were signifi cantly more likely to be cost-burdened 
in 2005 compared to 2000.
Affordability did not worsen uniformly for elderly households, however. In only Black Hawk, 
Johnson and Story counties were a statistically signifi cantly higher proportion of elderly households 
paying more than 30% of their income in rent. 
What could account for this difference? Many elderly renters live in complexes restricted to 
those 55 and older, and the supply of these units may be better matched to renter needs in some 
metropolitan areas. Elderly people may have more stable incomes than very young households, 
and some wealthier older households choose to rent. Although there are certainly many elderly 
households with limited incomes, households headed by someone under 25 are poorer on average. 
The same groups experienced housing affordability problems in 2005 as in 2000, but rising rents 
have increased the proportion of cost-burdened households within each income group. While Iowa 
continues to offer more affordable housing than many neighboring states, this asset is 
eroding slowly.
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CHART 1.13: 
Percent Cost-Burdened Renters, 2000–2005
By County
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CHART 1.14: 
Homeownership Aﬀ ordability by Age, 2005
By County
20
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Bl
ac
k 
H
aw
k
D
ub
uq
ue
Jo
hn
so
n
Li
nn
Po
lk
Po
tta
w
at
ta
m
ie
Sc
ot
t
St
or
y
W
oo
db
ur
y
Younger than 25
25 to 34
35 to 64
65 or older
CHART 1.15: 
Renter Aﬀ ordability by Age, 2005
By County
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CHART 1.16: 
Change in Cost-Burdened Renter Households
Younger than 25, 2000–2005,  By County
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Section One
 Housing Quality Changes: Estimated Lead Paint Hazards
Older homes may be an asset to communities, adding to local character and offering (potentially) 
affordable housing to both renters and owners. But older construction methods and materials 
also bring environmental hazards, in particular lead-based paint. Not all homes with lead-based 
paint pose a health threat, but deteriorating paint surfaces can pose a severe hazard, especially 
threatening to young children.2 While no systematic survey of the incidence of lead hazards in 
Iowa’s housing stock has been completed to our knowledge, it is possible to estimate the proportion 
of existing housing that may be affected, based on national surveys. 
Based on 2000 Census data, we also updated estimates statewide, for owner- and renter-occupied 
housing, to incorporate the new data differentiating homes with severe hazards from those with 
some lead paint. Map 1.11 shows the estimated proportion of the 2000 housing stock that may have 
lead hazards. 
Blood lead testing is required for children younger than six years who are covered by Medicaid, 
and the Iowa Department of Public Health recommends it for all other children. Most of this 
testing is done by healthcare providers. The results of all blood lead testing must be reported to 
the Iowa Department of Public Health. Results are reported for each cohort of children (thus, the 
most recent data available is for children born in 1999). The precision of the results is affected 
by the sample size, which varies among counties and over time. Map 1.12 shows the percentage 
of children born in 1999 who tested positive for lead poisoning before their sixth birthday; 
superimposed on each county is the percentage of eligible children tested in that county.
A comparison of the statewide results for the 1999 cohort of children with those for the 1995 
cohort suggests that the incidence of lead poisoning may have diminished over time. A larger 
sample of children were tested from the 1999 cohort than from the 1995 cohort (61.5% vs. 45%). 
Of those tested, 6.9% (1,584) of children born in 1999 tested positive, compared to 10.2% (1,689) 
of children born in 1995. A simple statistical test suggests3 that the proportion of children born in 
1999 who have lead poisoning may indeed have diminished compared to the proportion of children 
born in 1995. This improvement may result from a combination of efforts, including lead paint 
remediation during home rehabilitation.
2 Surfaces painted with lead-based paint do not always pose a health threat. Lead-based paint is a 
hazard if it is deteriorating or if it is on a surface that is chewable or is subject to friction or impact. 
Homes with lead-based paint hazards usually have high levels of lead in dust. Children become 
lead-poisoned when they put lead-based paint chips in their mouths or when they get 
lead-contaminated dust on their hands and toys and put their hands and toys in their mouths 
(Gergely, personal communication, November 12, 2006).
3 A difference-of-means test resulted in a probability score of 0.0202, suggesting we could 
be 95% conﬁ dent that the percent of affected children has diminished between the 
two cohorts.
MAP 1.11: 
Estimated Percent of Homes with Lead Hazards, 2000
MAP 1.12: 
Incidents of Lead Poisoning Among Children Born in 1999
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CHART 1.17: 
Change in Cost-Burdened Households 65 or Older, 
2000–2005, By County
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CHART 1.18: 
Estimated Percent of Homes with Lead Hazards, 2005
By County
 Conclusions
The trends outlined in this section suggest that during the fi rst half of this decade: 
• Most housing markets slackened as housing growth outstripped population growth;
• A few metropolitan areas saw robust growth, but much of this growth occurred in fringe   
 rather than central counties; 
• Iowa’s population became more diverse, and future increases in homeownership will likely  
 be among racial and ethnic minorities; 
• Housing prices grew much faster than family incomes, suggesting that the
 affordability gap will be a continuing concern, especially if the state is to continue to   
 attract new immigrants;
• Affordability problems did not worsen signifi cantly, but this may refl ect widening income  
 disparities rather than increasing affordability;
• There were encouraging signs that efforts to eliminate lead hazards may be paying off in  
 the decline in the percent of children testing positive for lead poisoning. 
Housing markets in Iowa appear to work well for most people. Homeownership rates are higher 
than most of our neighboring states, the proportion of households with affordability problems 
is (comparatively) low, and home values are stable. However, for a signifi cant minority of 
households, ownership may still be out of reach, housing costs may represent a signifi cant burden 
on income, and safe, decent quality housing may not be available at an affordable price. Some 
local housing markets may also be unstable, with stagnant prices too low to justify repair or 
replacement, rising vacancy rates and a shortage of housing attractive to young working families.

Meeting Housing Needs
Section Two:
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Section Two 
 Although housing markets work well for most Iowans, there are gaps (or failures) 
for those with lower incomes. State agencies coordinate an array of federal 
programs that address aspects of these gaps. A State Housing Trust Fund (SHTF) 
funds some needs and supports several local housing trust funds. This section 
assesses how adequately we have been able to meet housing assistance needs in 
the recent past (2003–2005). We examine four questions: 
• How have we done on rental housing needs? 
• How have we done on home buyer assistance? 
• How have we done on home rehabilitation assistance? 
• What are the major gaps or failures in our current array of programs?
Chart 2.1 on page 27 offers a rough estimate of the volume of housing assistance needs for 
owners and renters in 2005 (based on affordability indicators), and the volume of needs we 
have met through new resources provided from 2003 to 2005.
Lower-income homeowners4 may be helped with relatively shallow subsidies—a small down-
payment grant or a low-cost home improvement loan. It is more expensive to assist renters by 
building new apartments or providing ongoing rental assistance. At the pace we have been 
going during 2003 to 2005, it will take approximately 20 years to meet the current needs 
among low-income homeowners. However, our pace has been slower for renters; it would take 
about 64 years to meet current needs among cost-burdened renters.
By far, the majority of the assistance shown in Chart 2.1 came from federal sources. State 
contributions accounted for a tiny share of the total households assisted. The SHTF, 
established in 2003, has provided seed funds for several local housing trust funds, and 
has funded some projects directly. Using state funds has enabled new kinds of programs 
to emerge, such as those aimed at building developer capacity or providing a combination 
of capital investment and services. These purposes do not fi t easily into federal spending 
categories. During its fi rst two years of operation, the SHTF was funded in part by state 
appropriations ($0.8 million), and in part by revenues of the Iowa Finance Authority ($2.6 
million). One of the most striking successes of the SHTF has been the $46,949,715 raised in 
matching funds. This is an outstanding ratio of leverage for a small start-up program—every 
$1 spent out of SHTF monies has raised $13.72 in other funds, even though many of the 
programs the fund has supported (such as housing-related services) have not necessarily been 
direct revenue generators. Local governments also subsidize housing through tax abatements 
or the proceeds of tax increment fi nancing (TIF) bonds. Because our focus in this study is on 
state housing policy, we do not analyze local government programs.
How Have We Done on Rental Housing Needs? 
Most of Iowa’s subsidized rental housing was produced during the 1960s and 1970s, decades 
during which the state looked quite different than it does now. Public housing, Rural Housing 
Services (RHS) rental housing fi nanced through Section 515 loans, and other privately owned 
federally assisted housing provided large numbers of subsidized rental units during these 
decades. Thus, one challenge we face is the gap between current housing needs and the 
location of the existing subsidized stock.
Map 2.1 on page 27 shows existing subsidized rental units by county, as a percent of 
renter households in 2000. Several metropolitan counties have lower than average shares 
of subsidized units (on average, 17% of rental units in each county are subsidized). 
Dallas County is one of the outliers; a concentration of Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
(LIHTC) units (1,157), combined with units subsidized under RHS and Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) programs, serves a high proportion of the relatively small number of 
renter households in the county. Dallas County is also the fastest growing in Iowa, so the 
emphasis on providing new affordable rental units is likely justifi ed. Overall, though, we face 
the dilemma of an oversupply of housing in places that people are leaving and an undersupply 
in many of the areas to which they are moving.
Direct rental assistance to households avoids this problem. Map 2.2 on page 27 shows the 
estimated5 number of Section 8 rental assistance certifi cates available to county residents 
in 2005.
Rental assistance is a cost-effective way to aid households, especially in relatively soft 
housing markets. But it may not be appropriate for all needs. Rental certifi cates may not 
serve someone who needs a physically accessible adapted unit, and may be less easy to use in 
housing markets with very low vacancies. Most metropolitan counties have large numbers of 
certifi cates, but many fringe counties (where population growth has occurred more recently) 
do not. However, many certifi cates issued by Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) 
4 Households earning $35,000 or less in 2005 were at approximately 80% of the state’s 
median income of $43,609. Those earning $20,000 or less were at approximately 45% of 
the state’s median income.
5 This is not identical with the number of certiﬁ cates being used in a county; certiﬁ cates 
are now more portable and in some cases are administered by a regional housing 
authority that may provide assistance to residents of several counties. In such cases, we 
divide the number of certiﬁ cates the Housing Authority administers equally among the 
counties it serves to provide a fair estimate of the amount of assistance county residents 
may be expected to have access to. Households who receive certiﬁ cates from a housing 
authority are entitled to move away from that jurisdiction (including out of state) without 
losing their assistance.
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6The Pearson tests reported on the bivariate correlations in this chapter were signiﬁ cant 
at the 99% level. In other words, there is a one percent probability they are the result of 
chance association.
based in metropolitan counties are likely used in fringe counties. One issue Iowa faces is the 
portability of certifi cates, which may result in losses to neighboring states.
Recent rental subsidies have been better matched to renter needs. Map 2.3 on page 28 shows 
all subsidized rental units produced from 2003–2005 by three programs (HOME, LIHTC 
and the SHTF), as a percent of all renter households in each county. Most development has 
concentrated in metropolitan and adjacent counties, but some more rural counties have seen 
quite substantial production.
Have new rental subsidies been targeted to those communities likely to have the greatest 
need? We tested the relationship between the proportions of new subsidized rentals and 
three indicators: the growth of the housing stock since 2000, the increase in housing prices 
since 2000 and the incidence of rental affordability problems in each county in 2000. We 
tested whether the correlation between each pair of variables was statistically signifi cant 
(in other words, whether the correlation was likely to refl ect mere chance, or whether the 
characteristics were consistently related across counties).
We found that the proportion of new subsidized rental units was signifi cantly and positively 
related to both the rate of housing growth and the proportion of cost-burdened renters.6 There 
was no signifi cant relationship with increases in housing prices. This fi nding suggests that 
recent public investments in rental housing have been guided by rental affordability problems 
and by overall housing growth. Although Iowa has a large older stock of subsidized housing 
that is not ideally located to serve renter households in need, current policy has ensured that 
investments target areas with greater housing need. The problem is primarily one of providing 
suffi cient resources.
We face a further set of challenges: preserving the subsidized housing we do have. Much 
of the rental stock is approaching the age where major repairs are needed and where 
affordability restrictions are due to expire. Estimating the precise extent of physical needs 
and the possibility that owners will be able to “opt out” of subsidy contracts is diffi cult. Map 
2.4 on page 28 shows the proportion of rental units with assistance contracts that will expire 
between 2006 and 2011.
Many owners may choose to renew these contracts if funds are available, but others may 
choose to raise rents or sell the property. The map does not show another important threat: the 
proportion of subsidized rentals in need of major rehabilitation and modernization, but that 
lack reserve funds or borrowing capacity to meet these needs. A challenge we face is deciding 
which units should be preserved and fi nding the resources to do so.
 27
Section Two
MAP 2.1: 
Proportion of all Rental Units Subsidized, 2005
MAP 2.2: 
Distribution of Rental Assistance Certiﬁ cates, 2005
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CHART 2.1: 
Housing Needs, 2005, Compared to Housing Assistance, 
2003–2005
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MAP 2.3: 
Subsidized Rental Units Developed, 2003–2005
MAP 2.4:
Percent Subsidized Rentals with Assistance Contracts Expiring
2006–2011
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How Have We Done With Home Buyer Assistance? 
One reason homeownership has continued to expand in Iowa is that subsidies (in the form of 
low-interest loans or down-payment assistance) have helped many lower-income households 
buy their fi rst homes. Some subsidies serve moderate-income buyers of homes in targeted 
neighborhoods. Three major funding sources served Iowa home buyers from 2003 to 2005: 
the IFA FirstHome and FirstHome Plus programs; the RHS Section 502 guaranteed and 
direct loan programs; and the federally funded block grant program, HOME (which includes 
funds for the American Dream Downpayment Initiative). Many local governments offer down-
payment assistance programs (not included in this analysis), and some SHTF resources have 
been used to help home buyers. In general, much shallower subsidies are needed for home 
buyer loans than are needed for rental housing development or ongoing tenant assistance, so 
resources can be spread among many more households.
Map 2.5 summarizes the distribution of home buyer assistance under the FirstHome, RHS 
and HOME programs in 2003 and 2004 as a percentage of all home sales in those years. 
Several metropolitan counties—Polk, Dallas, Black Hawk and Pottawattamie—have low 
average market shares. Home buyer assistance appears to account for more than 10% of the 
market (as measured by residential sales) in many nonmetropolitan or micropolitan counties. 
It is clearly very important in Dubuque, Scott and Woodbury counties. 
We assessed how these average market shares were associated with three other county 
characteristics: the percent of cost-burdened homeowners, the estimated growth in housing 
units and the estimated increase in home prices from 2000 to 2004. Did any of these 
three indicators of affordability, supply or price show any relationship with the market 
share of home buyer assistance programs during the study period? The only statistically 
signifi cant correlation with average combined market share was a negative relationship 
with the estimated growth in housing units. In other words, home buyer assistance was 
concentrated in counties with slower-growing housing stocks. In turn, estimated housing stock 
growth was signifi cantly correlated with one other indicator—the percent of cost-burdened 
homeowners. In this case, the relationship was positive. In other words, counties with higher 
estimated housing growth also had higher proportions of cost-burdened owners, as we might 
expect. Thus, although there was no direct correlation between home buyer assistance and 
affordability indicators, assistance (in particular, RHS assistance) was concentrated in 
slower-growing places, and slower-growing places were likely to have fewer 
cost-burdened homeowners. 
Home buyer assistance is targeted primarily at households rather than communities. 
Nevertheless, there are some disparities in the share of homes that assisted buyers could 
afford in different communities. Appendix B shows the estimated percent of homes that 
would be affordable to eligible FirstHome and FirstHome Plus buyers in each county. In most 
places, a large share of the local housing market would be available to buyers. The exceptions 
are among the fastest-growing counties—Dallas and Johnson. One question for home buyer 
assistance programs in the future is whether some forms of assistance may be more effectively 
targeted to places where homeownership is further out of reach for lower-income families.
Section Two
MAP 2.5:
Market Share of all Subsidized Home Loans, 2003–2004
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How Have We Done With Owner-Occupied Home Rehabilitation? 
Low-income homeowners may face a different set of problems, such as lack of access to affordable 
home improvement loans. Rehabilitating existing housing is usually a far more affordable option 
than constructing new housing. Iowa has a housing stock much older than average, and older 
homes predominate in most nonmetropolitan areas. As Section One showed, older homes may 
have lead and other environmental hazards that threaten residents’ health. Modifying existing 
homes also may be a cost-effective way for people with physical limitations, especially the elderly, 
to remain independent. Improving energy effi ciency has social benefi ts beyond the improvement 
in quality of life and affordability for the households. From a “green” development perspective, 
recycling, rather than replacing our existing housing stock, is (usually) the most environmentally 
sensitive strategy. 
But fi nancing for home repairs is not always easily accessible on affordable terms, especially for 
homeowners with limited incomes, poor credit or who live in counties with stagnant or declining 
home values. Map 2.6 shows the proportion of high-cost home improvement loans made in each 
county in 2005.7 Communities where high-cost loans make up a signifi cant share of all home 
improvement lending may be in special need of subsidized home rehabilitation assistance. 
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds have been devoted exclusively to owner-
occupied rehabilitation since 2003. RHS Section 504 Direct Loans are also available for home 
improvements, and HOME funds have provided a small number of loans. Weatherization funds 
from the federal Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) target specifi c kinds 
of rehabilitation needs. These funds have become especially important in recent years, as home 
energy costs have risen dramatically. Map 2.7 shows how rehabilitation funds from all of these 
sources combined have been distributed by county between 2003 and 2005. Loans and grants 
have been focused outside of most metropolitan areas, refl ecting the older nonmetropolitan
housing stock.
We performed a statistical test on the correlations between the proportion of owner-occupied 
units assisted, and three indicators: the proportion of units likely to have lead hazards (this is a 
direct proxy for the age of homes), the proportion of high-cost home improvement loans in 2005 
and the average rate spread8 on home improvement loans in that year. We found a signifi cant 
positive correlation between the proportion of owner units with rehabilitation assistance and the 
proportion of units likely to have lead paint hazards (in other words, older units). The correlations 
with indicators of the cost of home improvement lending were slightly negative, but not statistically 
signifi cant. Owner-occupied rehabilitation spending has been effectively targeted to those 
communities with the greatest housing quality problems, but not necessarily those that may have 
problems with home improvement fi nancing.    
MAP 2.6:
Proportion of High-Cost Home Improvement Loans, 2005
7The map shows only the proportion of HOEPA loans, or loans that are high cost 
enough to require the institution to report them to HUD, under the Home Owners Equity 
Protection Act (HOEPA) of 1994. 
8The rate spread is the amount by which the loan interest rate exceeds the prime rate +3. 
It thus includes a wider array of somewhat high-cost loans that do not trigger 
HOEPA reporting.
MAP 2.7:
Proportion of Owner-Occupied Homes Rehabilitated,
2003–2005 
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Section Two
Where are the Major Gaps in our Housing Programs? 
We held a series of housing forums in early 2007, in which more than 80 practitioners 
participated. Developers, lenders, nonprofi t agencies, and federal, state and local government 
staff discussed the most signifi cant gaps they saw in Iowa’s current array of housing programs. 
Five major themes emerged from these discussions; they represent widely shared perspectives 
among the public and private (for-profi t and nonprofi t) sectors.
1. Underfunding and the Stability of Funding. The decline in federal funds 
 (especially HOME and CDBG funds) was probably the most widely mentioned challenge,  
 followed by the lack of state contributions to fi ll this gap. One participant summed up the  
 situation: “...too little money, too many issues to address, all we do is move resources   
 around without solving problems.” 
 Participants from Waterloo and Cedar Rapids pointed out they have two- to three-year   
 waiting lists for rental assistance and no other way to meet people’s needs. In Davenport,
 a participant described a 2,500 defi cit of apartments affordable to extremely low-income  
 households; the city has 560 vouchers available, but the waiting list for assistance is four  
 to fi ve years. In the homeownership session, the shortfall in federal funding for the rural   
 self-help program and the battles with an aging housing stock with too many rehabilitation  
 needs and too few funds were two of the issues mentioned. 
 Several participants pointed out that it was simply impossible to provide housing for   
 extremely low-income people without much deeper subsidies than are available now.
 Without deeper subsidies that would cover operating expenses as well as capital costs, we
 will continue to rely on a wasteful short-term solution: housing people in emergency   
 shelters while their problems intensify. 
2. Building and Sustaining Capacity. As many participants pointed out, it is impossible  
 to build capacity without a consistent, reliable funding stream. Participants in rural areas
 described the diffi culties they had fi nding qualifi ed contractors to bid on projects, and the  
 impossibility of developing a pool of experienced contractors (especially to work within the
 restrictions of rehabilitation programs) if they do not have reliable volume. Banks are put
 off by the amount of paperwork they have to do for homeowner assistance programs and   
 they do not have enough applicants under these programs to make it worth their while to
 develop this expertise. Without steady funding, the private and nonprofi t sectors cannot
 be expected to develop the permanent capacity needed to make housing assistance   
 programs work. 
3. Competing Needs. Many participants explained how overwhelming it was trying to   
 distribute limited resources among equally worthy clients. Faced with balancing the needs
 of elderly homeowners aging in place, against young fi rst-time buyers, against the needs   
 of severely disabled and extremely low-income renters, participants were frustrated by the
 lack of any fair decision criteria. Balancing program emphasis between rural and urban   
 areas was another diffi cult issue. Some rural participants argued their communities had
 plenty of affordable housing; others argued it was not necessarily available in the larger   
 towns, where people were most likely to fi nd employment. Urban participants reported   
 much larger affordable housing defi cits and an inability to serve the many households who
 needed very deep subsidies. 
 In practice, the needs that end up being met are those that are easiest to meet given
 current programs, not necessarily the needs to which we should give priority.
 The perception of many is that policy is made at the federal level. Developers, lenders and  
 hands-on service providers have very little ability to affect the broader federal decisions   
 that guide the distribution of resources. Those decisions sometimes appear arbitrary.
 Without a more substantial state contribution, it is diffi cult to reshape most federal   
 programs to meet local needs. 
4. Coordinating Programs and Rules. Layering subsidies to reach extremely low-income  
 renters requires creativity, stamina and too much time. It is diffi cult for an inexperienced
 developer to work his or her way through the maze of options, and go to different places to 
    fi nd different pieces of funding for a project, especially if it is innovative. Many participants 
    saw program restrictions as arbitrary. For instance, some home rehabilitation projects may
 be sorely needed but impossible because costs will exceed the dollar limit. Some
 participants believed that state interpretations of federal program restrictions were   
 sometimes mistaken and that fl exibility was possible. The sheer volume of programs and
 subprograms was seen as confusing, and most agency participants felt they had expertise  
 in a narrow area, but that there may be useful programs they didn’t know about. 
 Others complained that while it was possible to fund development, it was very diffi cult to
 fund the supportive services that many developments needed to work. Rental housing may  
 be available, but very low-income renters have diffi culty coming up with the security
 deposit they need, just as low-income homeowners may fi nd it diffi cult to assemble down  
 payments. Many emphasized the importance of education to keep people in homes. Low-  
 income home buyers need to understand the implications of refi nancing their mortgage at  
 sub-prime rates, or of making late payments; renters need to understand what it takes to be  
 a good renter. Without the education that some clients need, valuable subsidy dollars may  
 be lost. 
 There was widespread agreement that programs are not used or understood as well, or as
 widely, as they should be, and that the confusing array of possibilities may discourage   
 prospective developers. For instance, the perceived risks for a small nonprofi t in applying  
 for tax credits may discourage many from attempting to use the program.       
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5. Building Partnerships. Participants debated whether developers could be pushed
 beyond their current role without major changes in the stability, simplicity and
 accessibility of the programs with which they work. Some mentioned that employers   
 have played very little role in housing the labor force they rely on. If we need more
 housing assistance because more people earn less than living wages, should employers
 who benefi t from those low-wage workers be expected to contribute some assistance? Some  
 participants pointed out that local governments are increasingly less able to help, as even
 basic infrastructure investments exceed available revenues. One person described this 
 as a “rollback gap”: small towns don’t have suffi cient property tax revenues to invest in   
 essential infrastructure for new development, so in turn they don’t have the ability to 
 increase their tax base. 
 Others saw local governments as opponents of affordable housing rather than partners.
 Participants argued that in some places, city governments seem less interested in
 preserving older affordable units and more interested in stimulating conversion and   
 gentrifi cation. In others, insuffi cient multifamily zoning in places accessible to jobs, where
 land would be cheaper, excludes low-income renters. Most new rental development is only
 allowed in expensive suburbs where land prices ensure it won’t be affordable. 
 One fi nal point that many agreed with was that the housing sector’s role in other important
 areas—education, health, transportation, environmental preservation and economic   
 development—was rarely recognized. Participants believed that developing a better
 understanding of how stable, affordable housing contributes to other social priorities could  
 be the basis for broader support for the sector and for a better integrated housing policy. 
Conclusions
The quantitative assessment of housing programs raised several issues:
• Current levels of subsidy, especially for renter households, are inadequate to the volume of  
 need. At our current pace, it would take 20 years to address homeowners’ housing needs  
 and 64 years to address renters’ housing needs. 
• Renters need housing assistance most in the rapidly growing metropolitan and fringe   
 communities they work in, but much of our subsidized housing stock is elsewhere.
• Preserving the existing subsidized rental stock will require us to choose where we should  
 focus our efforts. 
• Home buyer assistance is targeted to households not communities, but fi rst-time buyers   
 may not be able to use assistance as easily in a few high-cost markets. 
• Home rehabilitation assistance is well-targeted to older communities, but future assistance  
 may need to consider the concentration of sub-prime home improvement loans in 
 some places. 
The housing forum discussions raised new issues that need to be considered: 
• Funding levels are shrinking, further reducing our ability to meet needs.
• Unstable and unpredictable funding makes it diffi cult to develop and sustain our capacity  
 to address housing needs. 
• Without clearly articulated and/or agreed-upon housing goals, we cannot expect to   
 distribute resources effectively.
• Complex and uncoordinated programs that few understand do not use resources effectively. 
• We need to develop stronger partnerships with employers, local governments and related  
 interests, such as transportation, environmental preservation, health, education and   
 economic development.  

Conclusions and Recommendations
Section Three:
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Iowa faces several challenges over the next decade. Some of these are clear from 
the evidence presented in the body of this report. Others emerged from the series 
of housing forum discussions we held in early 2007. We begin by summarizing 
these challenges and then go on to outline three major recommendations to 
address them.
Iowa’s Challenges
• Iowa’s economic (and demographic) stability depends on attracting new immigrants and
 slowing the departure of residents. Eroding housing affordability, communities that are   
 dull rather than vital and a narrower employment market will make this more diffi cult.   
 Housing alone cannot solve the problem, but it must be part of the solution. 
• Ensuring economic stability will require creating more living wage jobs and better jobs, so
 that fewer working Iowans need housing assistance and more qualifi ed residents have   
 reasons to stay. Increasing development and construction capacity will contribute to this. 
• Stabilizing homeownership, especially among newer owners, is essential to avert projected  
 increases in mortgage foreclosures, especially among sub-prime borrowers. If foreclosures  
 are concentrated in the same communities sub-prime loans are concentrated in, there   
 could be damaging longer-term effects. 
• Housing the working poor, people with disabilities and those facing homelessness will
 require much deeper subsidies than are available now. 
• Upgrading the quality of existing older homes continues to be a long-term challenge, but
 past efforts may be beginning to pay off in lower rates of lead poisoning among children.
• Preserving existing resources is important, but not all preservation is justifi ed or 
 cost-effective. Financial and physical decline need different sorts of responses. 
• Developing more sustainable homes may avert future preservation crises. Energy-effi cient
 construction has higher capital costs, but lower life-cycle costs; universal design can avoid  
 costly future retrofi tting. 
• Countering the negative image of affordable housing in some communities will be essential  
 to streamline the development process, avoid unnecessary urban sprawl and ensure that   
 the labor force has homes available in the communities in which they work. 
Section Three 
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Recommendation I: Iowa Needs a Statewide Housing Policy.
Without agreement on a proactive strategy, a valuable asset—not just many local housing 
markets throughout the state, but more important, the families they house—will continue to 
trickle through our fi ngers. Our current approach, to do our best to spend shrinking federal 
resources responsibly, does not focus on the major challenges we will face by 2017.  If we do 
not decide where to go, we cannot begin to talk about how to get there.
Rationale 
Many small incremental decisions may appear rational, but they may steer a course that is 
actually irrational. The choices we make based on extremely short-term considerations may 
end up costing far more in the long or even medium run than solving the problem would have 
cost. Without an explicit policy to guide the tradeoffs among short- and long-term solutions, 
and to track choices and outcomes over time, decision-makers cannot be expected to solve 
the complex challenges we face. An explicit and broadly supported statewide housing policy9 
would demonstrate why housing is such a good investment and how it would contribute to 
meeting many other economic and social goals. Some of the evidence for these arguments is 
presented in the second volume of this study.
Strategic Steps 
1. We need agreement on goals, values and priorities if we are to decide how resources   
 should be distributed equitably and effectively. 
2. Once we have a vision of what we want to do, we can work out what sorts of resources we
 need to achieve it. We should design an integrated mix of private resources, public subsidy,  
 individual responsibility and government regulatory supports. We should also work out
 where the crucial gaps are and make an argument to fi ll them.  
3. We need to maintain, fi ne-tune and improve this policy over time. To do this, we need to set
 quantifi able targets and collect the data needed to show whether targets have been
 achieved or not. Without clear evidence of outcomes, we cannot expect elected
 representatives to maintain their support through lean budget years and in the face   
 of competing demands. And, without regular evaluations of outcomes, we may not see
 opportunities for improvement or adjustments needed for changing conditions.
Action Steps
1. A lead agency or entity is needed to draw together a broad coalition of interests. It could 
 be a steering committee, but it would need to be stable and permanent. 
2. We could examine how other states or cities have reinvented their housing systems and   
 start thinking creatively about how Iowa could do the same. Sending potential participants  
 to “best practices” conferences or to spend a week at innovative agencies may be a good   
 way to stimulate creative thinking. Organizing a conference with external speakers,   
 focused on “how we reinvented our housing system,” could also help. 
3. We could run a multiday workshop or policy design charette at which all coalition partners  
 collaborate on designing our course of action (a housing policy). Individual tracks could   
 split up after the fi rst sessions to design systems that would feasibly meet specifi c sorts of
 needs, then reconvene to negotiate how these elements would fi t into the broader package. 
4. We should design and set up the regular reporting systems that would provide feedback   
 about outcomes. This could reorganize rather than add to existing reporting requirements.
9Although each of the agencies that deal with housing has a set of policies, these do not guide 
the state as a whole, and they may not reﬂ ect the full range of choices we face.
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Recommendation II: Stable, Predictable Funding and Eﬃ  cient Use 
of Resources are Both Essential for an Eﬀ ective Housing Policy.
Investing in housing is a long-term strategy, and short-term fl uctuations in funding undermine 
our progress. Iowa’s developers, mortgage lenders, local governments, nonprofi t agencies 
and families need a reliable commitment and a stable partnership to back their real estate 
investments. We also need to evaluate whether existing resources could be used 
more effectively. 
Rationale 
Investments in housing are long-term commitments. Years of investment are lost if a 
homeowner decides to stop making mortgage payments; the appreciated value of an apartment 
building is lost if the owner decides to stop maintaining the property. Although we all 
recognize this, the principle rarely informs decisions about resources. Federal funds, for many 
decades the major source of public subsidy, shrink or stagnate while need continues to grow. 
States and cities can no longer rely on federal assistance to meet housing needs. 
Many states (and some cities) realized this some time ago and have concentrated their 
energies on developing local alternatives. No matter the shape of the housing policy we 
develop, it will require one important thing: a stable commitment of resources that fi ts the 
real estate investment cycle rather than the election cycle. When programs wax and wane, 
they do more than cut off assistance for needy Iowans—they waste precious resources.
Strategic Steps 
1. The SHTF would be the appropriate vehicle for a stable, predictable source of funds.   
 Proposals for a dedicated source (real estate transfer taxes) in Iowa have not yet been 
 approved. This would be a valuable step forward in developing a sustainable funding   
 stream that would keep pace with rising housing costs. 
2. Stability should be addressed in other ways too. Spending scarce resources on home   
 buyers who default on their loans, or tenants who are disruptive, is wasteful. Education
 and supportive services should be an integral part of our strategies. Administering   
 effective programs and providing supportive services should be recognized as part of the  
 cost of doing business.
3. One of the most cost-effective strategies we could pursue would be to focus on preserving  
 what we have, where preservation is justifi ed by current need. The low-priced housing   
 stock faces a variety of threats: expiration of use restrictions, contract termination,
 bankruptcy, pressures to demolish or convert, and physical decline. No one strategy will   
 work, but groups of properties facing similar threats could be served by a joint 
 preservation effort.
Action Steps 
1. A joint conference with related interest groups (perhaps a roundtable session added to the
 end of one of the events described above) may strengthen the rationale for providing a   
 stable, predictable source of funding for strategic housing investments. 
2. We could establish ongoing sources of administrative and service support, both by using  
 complementary programs more strategically and by committing funds to the activities that  
 support development.
3. Developing a workforce housing demonstration project in partnership with one or two
 communities, emphasizing local capacity building, could strengthen recognition of   
 housing’s economic development impacts. 
4. We could investigate at least one innovative strategy a year. For instance, state provision
 of a guaranteed tenant security deposit program, combined with renter education, could   
 help place hard-to-house tenants in stable situations. 
Recommendation III: Build Developer Capacity and Streamline the 
Development Environment.
Better local capacity will expand the reach of programs and ensure resources are used more 
effectively. In too many communities, small-scale demand makes it uneconomical for the 
private for-profi t and nonprofi t sectors to use existing programs. In some communities, local 
regulatory and political barriers increase the costs of development or rehabilitation, reducing 
fi nancial feasibility and requiring more subsidies. When only a few developers compete for 
specialized programs, some types of worthwhile projects may be neglected. 
Rationale
Subsidies are scarce, and reducing project costs can reduce the amount of subsidy needed. 
Streamlining the development process does not mean that communities should be expected 
to give up all control over development. Most development regulations exist to protect the 
health, safety and welfare of citizens, to ensure that planned capital investments will meet 
infrastructure needs and to protect local property markets from externalities that will 
destabilize their value. These are valuable public purposes. However, not all regulations are 
justifi ed by these considerations. Often, perception rather than reality can be a more powerful 
force in shaping regulations.
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The second part of this study analyzes the evidence we have for the relationship between 
affordable rental housing development and local home values in Polk County. As the analysis 
shows, there is no compelling evidence that affordable rental developments reduce property 
appreciation. In some cases, well-designed projects may help jump-start a lagging market. 
What appears to be lacking in many communities is a proactive commitment to enabling 
developers to satisfy the local demand for affordable homes.  
This affects not just the supply of affordable housing, but also its distribution. Exclusionary 
regulations can exacerbate racial, ethnic and income segregation, and result in more 
commuting and suburban sprawl because affordable homes are not necessarily available 
where jobs are located. They can also affect equity between jurisdictions. Communities with a 
strong employment base may zone more land for revenue-producing industrial and commercial 
uses, leaving revenue-consuming uses (such as housing priced below $250,000) for outlying 
communities. The costs and benefi ts of economic prosperity are unevenly distributed: some 
communities have ample local revenues to enhance their economic development climate 
further, while others struggle to meet the needs of a primarily residential community without 
the revenue provided by the fi rms employing those residents. “Fiscal zoning” of this sort 
disadvantages not only many smaller local jurisdictions, but also the state as a whole as 
unmet local needs become the state’s responsibility. 
Local regulatory and political barriers are not the only reason for development delays. 
Another important source of delay is the complex negotiating process required to assemble 
several different layers of subsidized and unsubsidized fi nancing, each with different and 
sometimes contradictory restrictions. For inexperienced developers, this is an intimidating 
and often frustrating process, especially where the ultimate application will be judged in 
a competitive process with no guarantee that funding will be approved. Both technical 
assistance and direct assistance with assembling funding could help. 
Strategic Steps
1. Regulatory barriers to development should be an explicit focus of the housing policy   
 discussion described above. An increasing number of states use their land-use authority
 proactively to ensure that regulatory barriers to affordable housing development and   
 rehabilitation are reduced. Land-use planners and local elected offi cials should be part of
 housing policy discussions. 
2. Although Iowa has coordinated two major sources of subsidies—the LIHTC and HOME
 funds—much greater levels of coordination are possible. This could reduce entry barriers  
 for new developers and service providers, and speed the process. One-on-one assistance   
 to new or small developers in identifying and negotiating both public and private funding
 sources could be helpful. Another strategy may be to assemble a complete package of   
 resources from both public and private sources with one equity pool, one blended interest
 rate and an overall set of requirements. Eligible projects could be funded from those   
 pooled sources, requiring very little time or expertise from individual developers. A seed
 capital fund to enable small developers to take a risk on initial costs, such as land   
 assembly, would be another useful element.  
3. Other types of technical assistance could help shorten development lag times and   
 encourage more participants. Providing seed funds to enable small communities to
 commission market studies, training potential new developers to put together a fi nancial   
 pro forma, or educating all developers about ways to incorporate more energy-effi cient
 features into homes, are examples of strategies that could enhance development capacity.  
 While no guarantees can be provided for competitive fund allocations, there are ways to   
 cushion the risk that discourages thinly capitalized entities from taking new 
 development initiatives.
Action Steps
1. Reforming development regulations will not be a short-term fi x. We should initiate a   
 discussion about regulatory reform with land-use and environmental interest groups. In the
 medium term, a feasible legislative agenda may emerge. 
2. We could consider establishing a coordinated “one-stop shop” that would, at a minimum,  
 act as a clearinghouse for existing resources and offer basic technical assistance. Ideally,  
 such an entity could develop more proactive ways to streamline development by   
 coordinating fi nancial and technical assistance. 
3. At least one innovative initiative should be pursued annually to demonstrate that change  
 can happen. For instance, encouraging “greener” development could improve both the   
 fi nancial and environmental sustainability of affordable housing. Encouraging the legal,
 spatial and fi nancial integration of manufactured homes into the mainstream could improve  
 the match between housing costs, incomes and depressed local property markets. Many   
 other examples were mentioned in forum discussions. 
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The American Community Survey
The American Community Survey (ACS) is a replacement for the long-form decennial census 
data and was initiated nationwide in 2005. The full range of 2005 data was released in early 
October 2006, so Iowa is ahead of the curve in using this new source. As the ACS is phased 
in, multiyear averages will become available for all sizes of places. By 2010, the ACS will 
be a more useful source for full statewide comparisons and will offer some spatial detail for 
census tracts as well as small places. 
The ACS differs from the 2000 Census of Population and Housing. For instance, the 
median family income estimated by the ACS may differ from the median family income 
that would be reported if we had collected the information in exactly the same way as the 
2000 Census did. First, the sample size is much smaller and estimates are thus much less 
precise (upper and lower bound estimates are shown in each chart in the report). Second, a 
different population is surveyed because the ACS defi nes “residence” differently. Some older, 
wealthier Iowans who spend winters in Texas may not be included in annualized ACS income 
estimates (although they would have been if the 2005 survey had been conducted like the 
2000 Census), while some poorer, seasonal workers who work in Iowa for the summer may be 
included in income estimates for the state (although they would not have been counted in the 
2000 Census). Thus, evidence of income declines (and evidence of increases in poverty rates) 
based on the ACS is suggestive rather than conclusive.   
Vacancy rates are also different measures in the ACS compared to the Census. Because the 
ACS counts people where they are living and not at their permanent residence, there may be 
higher numbers of seasonally vacant units. More important, the confi dence interval around 
vacancy rates is wider than other housing characteristics because vacant units are only 
identifi ed during the follow-up on one in three households, in contrast to the 100% follow-up 
performed after the 2000 Census of Population and Housing. Thus, it is possible that vacant 
units are systematically underestimated in the ACS.    
Census Population Estimates 
The Census Bureau produces Inter-Censal Estimates of Population and basic demographic 
characteristics each year between decennial censuses. These estimates are based on cohort-
survival models of population change (births and deaths) and models of migration that rely on 
analyses of tax returns and other administrative sources. Tests of past estimates suggest that 
while they are fairly accurate for states and larger counties, they are much less accurate for 
smaller counties. While the estimation program has likely improved because of the additional 
data provided by the American Community Survey, this survey only began nationwide in 2005 
and so would not contribute to improving estimates during the fi rst four years of the decade. 
Thus, some of the county-level estimates presented here should be treated as suggestive rather 
than conclusive: they are a picture of what may have happened, not what has happened. We 
explore other sources of information to see whether there is corroborating evidence for the 
trends indicated in the Census Bureau estimates.   
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Data
This data is drawn from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data set, collected from 
lending institutions with headquarters in metropolitan areas. While bank consolidation 
and the rise of Internet lending has extended the reach of metropolitan-based fi rms into 
most nonmetropolitan counties, the data is incomplete. Nationally, it is estimated to cover 
approximately 80% of mortgages originated in any year, but coverage varies widely in Iowa 
by county, from less than 30% of home sales to close to 100%. Thus, estimates of lending 
patterns in nonmetropolitan counties may be biased because some types of borrowers may 
be more likely to obtain mortgages from metropolitan-based lenders (those who have Internet 
access or who are willing to shop for a mortgage by phone). The analyses presented here are 
limited to primary (fi rst-lien) loans for purchases of conventional single-family homes for 
owner occupation; purchases of manufactured homes are excluded. It includes only loans that 
were originated, not those purchased by an institution.  
County Assessor Data
Verifi ed sales are reported as the basis for tax assessment adjustments in an annual series 
of Sales Ratio studies issued by the Iowa Department of Revenue. This data is different than 
the median home value reported in the 2000 Census of Population and Housing and the 
American Community Survey. First, it is an average rather than a median value, so it may 
be more infl uenced by extremes in value. Second, it is based on the sales price recorded for 
legitimate market sales, so it does not refl ect the bias that may be introduced by homeowner 
assessments of the value of their home, which is what the 2000 Census and ACS report. 
Third, it includes all single-family residential sales, not just those of owner-occupied units. It 
is not assessed value, but helps form the basis for determining assessed value.
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In addition to the average sales price reported for each county, we estimated a distribution 
of sales prices in 2004. These estimates are based on verifi ed sales data (not assessed value 
data) from County Assessors. We used the rate of increase in verifi ed sales from 2000 to 
2004 to infl ate the estimates of lower, middle and upper quartiles of home values as reported 
in the 2000 Census. These distributions are shown in the fi rst three columns of Table B.1 
on page 43. To provide a check on these results, we also calculated the distribution of home 
loans originated that year. We would expect that total home values would be higher than total 
loan amounts because most buyers provide a down payment. The distributions of loan size are 
shown in columns four through six of Table B.1. The HMDA data corroborate the estimates of 
home value distribution. 
In Table B.2 on page 44, we estimated the proportion of homes that would be affordable to 
households eligible for the FirstHome program (those at median income) and to households 
eligible for the FirstHome Plus program (those at 80% of the statewide median income). 
We did this by using the rate of increase in verifi ed sales from 2000 to 2004 to infl ate the 
distribution of home values reported in the 2000 Census. Then, we calculated the price of 
a home that would be affordable to a household at each income level, using the prevailing 
interest rate for the programs as of December 2006, assuming total monthly household debt 
of $600 and $2,000 in funds available for a down payment. For instance, for a household 
eligible for the FirstHome Plus program, earning $46,240, an affordable home would be 
priced at $151,815. 
Using the infl ated distribution of home values, we were able to estimate the percentage 
of owner-occupied homes in the county valued at that amount or less. Table B.2 shows 
the percent of homes affordable to buyers eligible for FirstHome and FirstHome Plus, 
respectively. We should emphasize that these are approximations of the number of affordable 
homes. Census-reported home values are not the same as actual market values and the 
distribution of home prices may have changed since 2000. This estimate also does not say 
anything about available for-sale homes or about the quality of homes. There may be many 
affordable homes in a community, but very few available for sale. Or, available homes may not 
be of adequate quality. 
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TABLE B.1:
Estimated Distribution of Home Values, 2004
Appendix B: Distribution of Home Values
44
Adair 98.01% 92.49%
Adams 98.21% 95.36%
Allamakee 96.73% 90.15%
Appanoose 98.39% 93.51%
Audubon 98.30% 94.95%
Benton 93.83% 77.82%
Black Hawk 92.13% 81.93%
Boone 93.36% 82.26%
Bremer 91.70% 77.69%
Buchanan 96.35% 87.70%
Buena Vista 92.50% 85.68%
Butler 98.27% 92.01%
Calhoun 96.10% 92.00%
Carroll 94.66% 84.88%
Cass 96.97% 91.11%
Cedar 94.90% 81.41%
Cerro Gordo 90.77% 80.64%
Cherokee 97.88% 91.13%
Chickasaw 96.26% 87.23%
Clarke 96.84% 89.89%
Clay 92.98% 84.46%
Clayton 95.30% 90.44%
Clinton 97.04% 88.44%
Crawford 98.08% 91.83%
Dallas 85.35% 35.17%
Davis 95.55% 93.03%
Decatur 99.02% 94.42%
Delaware 93.51% 83.04%
Des Moines 94.97% 86.13%
Dickinson 77.68% 62.10%
Dubuque 91.87% 73.54%
Emmet 98.60% 94.01%
Fayette 98.12% 92.41%
Floyd 97.11% 90.40%
Franklin 97.62% 93.30%
Fremont 96.40% 91.41%
Greene 97.98% 94.90%
Grundy 96.22% 86.72%
Guthrie 89.16% 81.57%
Hamilton 95.32% 89.33%
Hancock 96.16% 89.62%
Hardin 96.05% 91.10%
Harrison 96.94% 84.98%
Henry 94.94% 85.86%
Howard 96.60% 90.54%
Humboldt 93.34% 84.58%
Ida 97.50% 93.11%
Iowa 94.32% 79.76%
Jackson 96.12% 83.95%
Jasper 94.72% 79.35%
Jefferson 91.44% 81.75%
Johnson 83.24% 45.48%
Jones 94.65% 83.29%
Keokuk 99.10% 95.12%
Kossuth 96.92% 89.62%
Lee 96.44% 89.96%
Linn 90.63% 67.89%
Louisa 98.38% 93.29%
Lucas 97.42% 92.65%
Lyon 97.18% 90.92%
Madison 94.90% 77.46%
Mahaska 94.86% 86.44%
Marion 89.75% 75.12%
Marshall 94.83% 86.60%
Mills 88.45% 70.15%
Mitchell 96.53% 90.65%
Monona 98.64% 94.48%
Monroe 97.76% 94.11%
Montgomery 97.77% 93.01%
Muscatine 91.79% 76.80%
O’Brien 95.99% 88.87%
Osceola 97.87% 93.57%
Page 98.34% 92.56%
Palo Alto 98.03% 93.68%
Plymouth 89.07% 75.52%
Pocahontas 98.91% 96.80%
Polk 91.33% 65.26%
Pottawattamie 94.22% 77.11%
Poweshiek 91.87% 78.64%
Ringgold 98.16% 90.80%
Sac 98.17% 94.71%
Scott 90.36% 73.91%
Shelby 94.94% 86.08%
Sioux 94.26% 80.88%
Story 90.85% 56.78%
Tama 97.49% 92.14%
Taylor 99.24% 98.35%
Union 97.45% 93.79%
Van Buren 98.95% 97.13%
Wapello 97.13% 91.31%
Warren 89.19% 68.83%
Washington 92.29% 82.07%
Wayne 98.55% 97.02%
Webster 95.14% 87.96%
Winnebago 98.69% 92.78%
Winneshiek 91.22% 76.78%
Woodbury 93.74% 81.82%
Worth 97.32% 93.33%
Wright 97.66% 93.18%
County
Percent Homes
Affordable to FH
Eligible Household
Percent Homes
Affordable to FH+
Eligible Household County
Percent Homes
Affordable to FH
Eligible Household
Percent Homes
Affordable to FH+
Eligible Household County
Percent Homes
Affordable to FH
Eligible Household
Percent Homes
Affordable to FH+
Eligible Household
TABLE B.2:
Estimated Percent of Homes Aﬀ ordable to FirstHome-Eligible Buyers
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People with physical activity limitations can have diffi culty fi nding decent appropriate 
housing adapted to their needs. A majority of elderly people would prefer to remain in their 
own homes as long as possible; 90% of households aged 70 or older live in conventional 
housing (Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2000). Home modifi cations such as grab bars and 
other bathroom adaptations, ramps or widened doorways can help people age in place. For 
non-elderly people with physical disabilities, home modifi cations are equally important. The 
market for universally designed new homes is expected to grow as the baby boomer generation 
ages, but many needs may also be met by modifying existing homes. In a state like Iowa, 
where the housing stock is growing faster than the population and where new construction 
is less feasible in precisely the counties with the largest elderly populations, encouraging 
the reuse of existing homes through modifi cations is especially important. This section 
attempts to estimate the unmet demand for home modifi cations among elderly and non-elderly 
households with activity limitations.  
Although the Census and the ACS estimate the number of people with activity limitations, 
unfortunately neither survey estimates the incidence of home modifi cations to accommodate 
people with disabilities. A special supplement to the 1995 American Housing Survey (AHS) 
did address this question, however, providing an estimate of both the incidence of, and unmet 
need for, several kinds of modifi cations. This offers a baseline for estimates, but the age 
of the data raises some concerns that it may overestimate needs by not taking into account 
modifi cations that have occurred since 1995. Some needs (such as those for telephones 
adapted for people with hearing disabilities) are likely to be much more widely met given 
technology advances in the recent past. Some modifi cations are relatively low cost (such 
as adding grab bars), while others (installing elevators or chair lifts) are likely to be major 
expenditures. The available data show the reported unmet need by type of modifi cation, 
so that the same household may report more than one unmet need (for both grab bars and 
bathroom modifi cations, for instance).
We estimated the number of all unmet needs for home modifi cations based on household 
characteristics in 2000, the latest year for which we have data for all counties. We estimated a 
subset of “major” needs10 that would likely require a signifi cant investment, which we show in 
Map C.1. Detailed county estimates provided for all households and elderly households only 
are shown in Table C.1. 
MAP C.1:
Major Unmet Home Modiﬁ cation Needs, 2000
Appendix C: Estimating Unmet Needs for Home Modiﬁ cations Among Households With Disabilities
10“Major” modiﬁ cation needs included widened doors or hallways, ramps, easy-access 
bathrooms and kitchens, elevators or stair lifts, and modiﬁ ed cabinets. Other modiﬁ cation 
needs judged to involve much less investment included handrails or grab bars, door handles 
instead of knobs, push bars on doors, modiﬁ ed wall sockets or light switches, specially 
equipped telephones, ﬂ ashing lights, raised lettering or braille, and other modiﬁ cations.
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TABLE C.1:
Estimated Need for Home Modiﬁ cations, 2000
Adair 28 32
Adans 16 18
Allamakee 41 54
Appanoose 42 55
Audubon 24 26
Benton 62 92
Black Hawk 282 469
Boone 64 98
Bremer 58 84
Buchanan 52 75
Buena Vista 50 71
Butler 46 58
Calhoun 40 43
Carroll 63 80
Cass 46 58
Cedar 44 67
Cerro Gordo 124 183
Cherokee 41 51
Chickasaw 37 49
Clarke 26 34
Clay 50 68
Clayton 52 70
Clinton 121 190
Crawford 45 61
Dallas 69 147
Davis 22 30
Decatur 24 31
Delaware 40 64
Des Moines 113 163
Dickinson 52 67
Dubuque 189 318
Emmet 32 42
Fayette 63 83
Floyd 49 64
Franklin 32 41
Fremont 25 30
Greene 34 40
Grundy 35 47
Guthrie 37 44
Hamilton 48 63
Hancock 33 45
Hardin 58 72
Harrison 43 58
Henry 45 72
Howard 30 37
Humboldt 36 41
0362adI
Iowa 41 58
Jackson 54 76
Jasper 92 139
Jefferson 35 63
Johnson 130 416
Jones 49 71
Keokuk 37 43
Kossuth 54 66
Lee 102 143
Linn 372 724
Louisa 26 43
Lucas 29 36
Lyon 32 42
Madison 33 50
Mahaska 56 84
Marion 72 113
Marshall 94 145
Mills 31 50
Mitchell 36 41
Monona 38 40
Monroe 25 30
Montgomery 36 46
Muscatine 81 150
O’Brien 45 57
Osceola 19 26
Page 50 63
Palo Alto 33 39
Plymouth 62 88
Pocahontas 29 34
Polk 663 1407
Pottawattamie 187 319
Poweshiek 47 70
Ringgold 21 21
Sac 38 45
Scott 291 588
Shelby 38 49
Sioux 73 101
Story 113 277
Tama 49 66
Taylor 23 27
Union 34 49
Van Buren 25 30
Wapello 97 139
Warren 75 139
Washington 54 76
Wayne 24 27
Webster 99 150
Winnebago 35 45
Winneshiek 55 73
Woodbury 212 369
Worth 24 31
Wright 47 56
County
Major Unmet 
Needs for 
Elderly Households
Major Unmet 
Needs for
All Households County
Major Unmet 
Needs for 
Elderly Households
Major Unmet 
Needs for
All Households County
Major Unmet 
Needs for 
Elderly Households
Major Unmet 
Needs for
All Households
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